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FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR DIVORCE DECREES-
PRESENT DOCTRINE AND POSSIBLE CHANGES
JAMES D. SUMNER, JR.*
IN GENERAL
The recognition of divorce decrees has perhaps created more con-
cern in the United States than any other legal issue. At least this
is a matter that has frequently been the subject of public discussions
and articles in national magazines in the last decade and a half. The
"laymen" who have participated in these events probably have not
realized the technical legal problems involved. However, they have
at least by their discussions and writings demonstrated that migratory
divorces and respect for them raise problems of national significance.
Moreover, there is an abundance of legal articles by judges, lawyers,
law teachers and law students dealing with the validity and extra-
territorial respect to be accorded foreign decrees of divorce. Both
favorable and unfavorable reactions to the present status of divorce
law are to be found in these articles. But even with all of this wide-
spread interest the Supreme Court of the United States has taken the
most prominent role. Not only has much of the Court's time been
devoted to extra-state credit for divorce decrees, but the burden of
prescribing policies and criteria has been shouldered by this tribunal.
It is the purpose of this article to consider this problem which has
been the subject of such widespread interest and concern. Attention
will first be focused on some of the policies which appear to underlie
the rules that have been developed to govern full faith and credit for
decrees of divorce. Moreover, a review of the working rules which
are now followed will be given, as well as the bases upon which full
faith and credit is given or withheld. In the later portions of the
article alternative approaches to certain problems will be discussed,
as well as their feasibility. And lastly, mention will be made of the
ways in which these possibilities could be put into effect.
POLICIES UNDERLYING RECOGNTION
The principal policies underlying the recognition of divorce de-
crees are to a great extent different from those applied to other judicial
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proceedings. During one period in the past, it appears that the policy
of the Supreme Court in supervising full faith and credit was that of
discouraging migratory divorces. This attitude was presumably taken
to protect the interests of the state of matrimonial domicil. There
was greater concern over the states' interests than there was with
the desires, rights and status of individuals. During the time that this
course of action was followed, extra-state respect was not required
unless there were several contacts present in the divorcing state.1
Therefore, full faith and credit was not demanded for an ex parte
decree acquired in a state in which only the plaintiff was domiciled.
Moreover, the Supreme Court at one time even considered fault to
be a jurisdictional fact in deciding whether there was a contact other
than the domicil of one party in the forum state.2 These holdings
created considerable uncertainty as to the credence to be accorded
a foreign decree and thereby discouraged the seeking of migratory
divorces. However, maximum protection of the states' interests in the
marital status of their citizens was afforded prior to 1942.
It would appear that the present concern of the Court is to stabilize
the marital status of individuals in that faith and credit is now
required for divorce decrees to a greater extent than ever before in
this country. Since 1942 a decree obtained in a state in which only the
plaintiff was domiciled is entitled to constitutional protection.3 While
such a judicial act was respected in most states even prior to Williams
v. North Carolina, this was the first time that compulsory comity was
prescribed for it. Thus in the first Williams case and subsequent cases
the Supreme Court's primary attention has shifted from seeking
ultimate respect for state interests to attempts to procure uniformity
respecting the status of individuals. But the Supreme Court did not
completely lose sight of the concernments of the state of matrimonial
domicil in its efforts to achieve certainty for the marital status. The
right to relitigate the judicial jurisdiction of the first forum was
preserved.4 On the basis of cases decided in the last few years, there
is less chance than ever that a decree will be denied extra-state pro-
tection. This additional guarantee is the result of the extended
estoppel principles now applied in the field.5
There is yet another policy which one would be justified in saying
that the Supreme Court now applies in respect to extra-territorial
recognition of divorce decrees. The Supreme Court cases of the
last decade and a half indicate an attempt to supplement insufficient
1. E.g., Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175
(1901).
2. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906), overruled in Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
3. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
4. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
5. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581
(1951); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
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state divorce acts by requiring greater respect for migratory decrees
obtained by persons from the "strict" states.6 This policy certainly
reflects the consensus that the existing laws on divorce in many states
are not sufficient to satisfy the needs and demands of society. The
attitudes and mores of the people are often at odds with the divorce
laws, and a number of factors give rise to this conflict. One of the
causes is the failure of some states to provide adequate grounds.
In many instances no act has been committed which is a ground for
divorce in the home state, and yet, practically speaking, the marriage
is terminated. Strictness in the granting of divorces as well as lengthy
residence requirements are likewise contributing factors. The only
recourse left when relief is unavailable at home is to travel elsewhere
to have the marital status severed. This often involves a trip to an
easy-divorce, short-residence state with but few people realizing the
legal implication of such conduct. However, it is at least possible to
obtain relief which is not available at the place where the parties last
lived together, and it can be obtained with little effort.
All this indicates that the law has not kept abreast of the times.
The law has lagged. No doubt there is always a gap between the law
and the demands of society, but the greater the gap, the less effective
are the laws. As long as we have inadequate divorce laws, we will be
troubled with the effect to be accorded migratory decrees. The judges
have fully realized the variance between what is available and what
is wanted. As one put it, the persons who get Reno divorces are "the
victims of a legal system of divorce at war with social convention.
'7
Moreover, as suggested above, the Supreme Court is apparently
aware of the inadequacy of many of our divorce laws.
However, not all policies underlying full faith and credit for divorce
decrees are different from those applicable to other judicial proceed-
ings. Some policies which are pertinent to the enforcement of law
judgments are likewise pertinent to the recognition of decrees of
divorce. The principal one of these is the doctrine of res judicata. Here,
as well as in other situations, the Supreme Court has in the last few
years limited the opportunity of a person to attack collaterally a pro-
ceeding in which he has participated.
NATURE OF DIVORCE DECREES
Before discussing the extra-territorial recognition of divorce de-
crees, it would be helpful to consider the nature of the original pro-
ceeding. Quite necessarily, the incidents of these proceedings are the
roots of the difficulties that arise in connection with full faith and
credit.
6. The parties in each of the cases cited in note 5 supra, were from
"strict" states, and the decrees were obtained in easy divorce states.




In this country a divorce- suit has always been regarded as in the
nature of an in rem proceeding. Consequently, it is held that judicial
jurisdiction over the defendant spouse is not necessary, as it is in the
ordinary adversary proceeding. While the mere tagging of such
suits means nothing in and of itself, nonetheless, it is important in
forming a rationalization for the ability of a court to grant a divorce
against a person over whom it has no power. If there is no judicial
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, there must be judicial
jurisdiction over the res, or else there is no basis for the decree. A
court cannot render a valid decision unless it has judicial jurisdiction
over the parties or the res. Certainly we would not have near the
problem pertaining to the recognition of divorce decrees were divorce
actions considered in personam. However, hardship would be pre-
dominant. In many instances it would be impossible to obtain judicial
jurisdiction over the defendant in a forum that recognized the alleged
wrongful act as a ground for divorce. In that the divorce suit is
treated as in rem, it is necessary for the forum to have judicial juris-
diction over the matrimonial status.
Since this status is intangible, some fictitious basis for getting the
res before the court had to be devised. Moreover, it was necessary for
the connecting link with the forum to be sufficient under the due
process clause. There were several possibilities: the place where each
party resided, the state in which they were married, the last common
domicil and the place of the domicil of each.
Notwithstanding the fact that there are such possible contact points
which could be treated as giving courts judicial jurisdiction to grant
divorces, traditionally domicil has been used in this country.8 Some
states require the domicil of both parties; others require only the
domicil of one.
In a legal controversy which involves several states the courts
usually select the law of the state that has the greatest interest in the
transaction or event; or as it is often put, the law of the state with
which there was a substantial or reasonable contact is to be applied.
In fact such a choice is compulsory under the due process clause.
In divorce suits there are a number of choices that could be made:
law of the domicil of the parties, law of the last matrimonial domicil,
law of the place of marriage, or law of the place where the alleged act
occurred. The courts in this country have always applied the divorce
act of the forum. In that one of the parties, or both, must be domiciled
in the forum for jurisdictional purposes, this in effect means that
the law of the domicil of the plaintiff is utilized. Consequently, the
jurisdictional basis and the rule of reference in divorce proceedings
are the same.
8. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 396 (3d ed. 1949).
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FULL FAITH AD CREDIT
Insofar as the recognition of divorce decrees in the United States
is concerned, we need not go back prior to 1942. 9 Suffice it to say
that before 1942 the Supreme Court had held that a state was not
compelled to give full faith and credit to a divorce decree unless the
rendering state had as minimum contacts the domicil of one of the
parties plus "something else." That extra contact could be tfhe
domicil of the other party, the matrimonial domicil, presence of the
other party, or service of process within the jurisdiction on the other
party. This formula was applied at the time when the Supreme Court
apparently pursued the policy of discouraging migratory divorces.
However, in 1942 in the case of Williams v. North Carolina,0 the
Court relaxed its minimum requirements. In that case it was held
that a decree granted by a court in a state wherein only one of the
parties was domiciled was entitled to full faith and credit. Thus,
the Court eliminated the "plus element" which was previously re-
quired in addition to the domicil of one of the parties.
Under this new standard, it became possible for a divorce to be had
by one of the spouses, even without the consent or presence of the
other, and for such a decree to be entitled to full faith and credit. The
Supreme Court put it this way:
"Thus it is plain that each state, by virtue of its command over its
domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of marriage, can
alter within its own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled
there, even though the other spouse is absent."11
"[Tihey were wholly effective to change in that state the marital status
of the petitioners and each of the other spouses by the North Carolina
marriages."' 2
In answer to a contention that under such a rule a party might be
considered as divorced in one state and regarded as married in another,
or that children might be legitimate in one place and illegitimate in
another, the Court said: "[T]hey constitute 'a pure fiction, and fiction
always is a poor ground for changing substantial rights.' ",3 Of course,
if the domicil of the plaintiff was bona fide and was not challenged
elsewhere, the Court's answer to the above contention is correct. But
not so if there is a challenge of the judicial jurisdiction, as will be
discussed further on.
By way of justifying its requirement of compulsory recognition of
a decree granted in a state where only one party was domiciled, the
Court said:
9. For a discussion of the cases decided prior to 1942, see STUMBERG, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 298 (2d ed. 1951).
10. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
11. Id. at 298.
12. Id. at 299.
13. Id. at 300.
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"Certainly if decrees of a state altering the marital status of its domi-
ciliaries are not valid throughout the Union even though the requirements
of procedural process are wholly met, a rule would be fostered which
could not help but bring 'considerable disaster to innocent persons' and
'bastardize children hitherto supposed to be the offspring of legal mar-
riage,' or else encourage collusive divorce." 14
There is an obvious answer to this. A state which grants a divorce
where the only basis of jurisdiction is the domicil of one party should
foresee such results, as should the person seeking the decree. However,
as a result of the first Williams case, a one-party-domicil divorce must
be respected elsewhere in the absence of a contest of the finding of
domicil. Moreover, the holding means that a state may grant a di-
vorce to a person who has been a domiciliary of the state a minimum
period of time-42 days in Nevada. While the standard provided in
the Williams case is extremely liberal, it at least decreases the un-
certainty which existed under Haddock v. Haddock.15 No longer was
the Supreme Court primarily concerned with the interests of the state
of matrimonial domicil, but its goal was to stablize the marital status
of the parties.
After prescribing the new basis upon which divorces were to be
recognized, the Supreme Court remanded the Williams case in order
that the state court could relitigate Nevada's finding of domicil. This
the North Carolina court did, and it was found that there was no
legitimate domicil established in Nevada. This finding was taken to
the Supreme Court, and in the second Williams case16 the Court
reiterated the old doctrine that a second state may always inquire into
a finding of jurisdiction by the first court. This principle had been
firmly crystallized in Thompson v. Whitman.17 By permitting the
second court to relitigate the jurisdictional facts-domicil-the Court
allowed the possibility of conflicting findings of domicil by the re-
spective states as was true here. However, on this point the Court
said:
"Neither the Fourteenth Amendment, nor the full faith and credit clause
requires uniformity in the decisions of the courts of different states as to
the place of domicil, where the exercise of state power is dependent
upon domicil within its boundaries."18
As just indicated the principles of the second Williams case were
not new, but ones of very old standing. However, it was necessary
for the court to get around the fundamental basis of full faith and
credit which requires that a judicial proceeding be given the same
effect and credit in the second forum as that accorded it in the
14. Id. at 301.
15. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
16. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
17. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873).
18. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 231 (1945).
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rendering state. No doubt the Nevada decree would be treated as
valid for all purposes in Nevada. How, then, could it be attacked else-
where? The Court's answer was that the full faith and credit principle
comes into operation only when the jurisdiction of the other court
is not impeached.
It can be seen that under the second Williams case the facts classi-
fied in the first as being fictitious can be realities.19 It is not fiction
to say that a man might be treated as a married man in one state and
divorced in another. Mr. Williams fully realized this after his con-
viction for bigamous cohabitation in North Carolina was affirmed by
the Supreme Court.
Although there v~as a modification of standards, the Williams cases
did little for nation-wide recognition of divorces in the United
States. Most of the states were already giving full faith and credit
to decrees awarded in a state in which only one of the parties was
domiciled. So at the most the new basis for recognition insured
greater sanctity in only a limited number of states.
The apparent uncertainty about divorce decrees and the right to
contest them is more limited than appears on the surface. In the
first place, the decree when pleaded in another forum is entitled to
prima facie validity.20 Therefore, the party who alleges the invalidity
of the decree on the basis of lack of jurisdiction has the burden of
proof. The opportunity to contest has been further circumscribed
by the doctrine set forth in the case of Sherrer v. Sherrer in 1948.21 In
this case the Court held that by virtue of the full faith and credit
clause a person is estopped to assail the validity of a decree after
having filed a general denial and having appeared and participated in
the proceeding. The respondent in the case had not in any way re-
butted the petitioner's allegation of domicil. However, it was the
Court's opinion that the respondent had an opportunity to do so and
since there was the opportunity, no second chance was available.
There was a companion case in which the Court applied the same
rule.2 2 In this case the defendant appeared personally and filed an
answer admitting the allegations of domicil and filed a cross-complaint
for divorce. A decree was rendered on the cross-complaint, and the
defendant subsequently attempted to contest the validity of the decree.
The rule applied in these two cases is but an extension of a principle
settled in Davis v. Davis23 in 1938. In the Davis case the Court held
that where the jurisdictional issue had been raised and litigated in
the first proceeding, the defendant was estopped to raise it in the
second forum. Thus, litigation of the question works an estoppel
19. See note 13 supra.
20. See, e.g., Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, 325 U.S. 279, 280 (1945).
21. 334U.S. 343 (1948).
22. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
23. 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
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based on the theory that the party presumably could not collaterally
attack in the granting forum and thus cannot elsewhere, because a
decree receives the same validity accorded it where rendered. Under
the Sherrer and Coe holdings, the Court goes further and holds that
where there is an opportunity to raise the jurisdictional issue through a
personal appearance and participation, the estoppel doctrine is ap-
plicable.
The theory of all of these cases is that a party under such circum-
stances would be estopped in the first state and is therefore estopped
elsewhere. The Court assumes that there could be no collateral at-
tack in the first forum as between the immediate parties without too
much concern as to the law of that state. Presumably, although
probably no state permits it, if there could be a collateral attack in
the original forum, there could be elsewhere. However, it should
be noted that there is no ruling on the validity of the decree in these
cases. The question is solely whether a party is to be precluded from
assailing a decree because of his conduct. The point was emphatically
made by the Court in this way:
"It is one thing to recognize as permissible the judicial reexamination
of findings of jurisdictional fact where such findings have been made
by a court of a sister State which has entered a divorce decree in ex
parte proceedings. It is quite another thing to hold that the vital rights
and interests involved in divorce litigation may be held in suspense pend-
ing the scrutiny by courts of sister States of findings of jurisdictional fact
made by a competent court in proceedings conducted in a manner con-
sistent with the highest requirements of due process and in which the
defendant has participated.... That vital interests are involved in divorce
litigation indicates to us that it is a matter of greater rather than lesser
importance that there should be a place to end such litigation."24
Even though the Court precludes further attack where there has
been an opportunity to contest jurisdiction, it should be noted that
in effect parties are permitted to confer jurisdiction upon a court
where in fact there is none present. Or to state it more bluntly, we
now have divorce by consent, and this is sanctioned by the Supreme
Court under the guise of estoppel.
Several questions were left unanswered by the Sherrer and Coe
cases. One was whether a party who had made a general appearance,
either personally or through an attorney, without answering or par-
ticipating in the proceeding would be estopped from collaterally at-
tacking. No case raising this specific question has come before the
Supreme Court. However, it would undoubtedly be held that such
conduct would preclude a subsequent attack since there was an op-
portunity to contest in the original proceeding. This has been the
24. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948).
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conclusion expressed in the state decisions.2 5 Another matter not
solved by the Sherrer and Coe decisions is whether a state could ques-
tion the finding of domicil when both parties would be precluded from
doing so. In other words, suppose that under the facts in the Sherrer
case the second state prosecuted one of the parties for bigamous
cohabitation. Would the conviction be upheld? The first argument to
be given in support of the view that the state would not be estopped
is that the doctrine does not operate against a sovereign. And secondly,
it is to be noted that only those in privy with the original proceeding
are bound by it. Since the state was not a party, it should not be pre-
cluded from relitigating the jurisdictional issue. Moreover, it is
difficult to visualize the application of the estoppel doctrine to a
state in the present-day context. With a federal government stronger
than ever before and with a clamor for the protection of states' rights,
there is little likelihood that the Supreme Court would strike such
a conviction. However, it should be kept in mind that this same
logic was used in regard to the rights of third parties, but it was not
adopted by the Court. The principle of the Cook and Johnson cases,
26
mentioned below, could well be applied to the states.
There was yet another question left unanswered by the Sherrer and
Coe cases. Do third persons who were not parties to the initial pro-
ceeding have the right to contest? There have been two recent cases
involving this issue decided by the Supreme Court since the estoppel
doctrine was broadened in 1948. The first of these was Johnson v.
Muelberger.27 In this case the wife and husband were residents of
New York, and the wife supposedly established a residence in
Florida. In violation of a Florida statute, she sued for a divorce before
she had been a resident for ninety days. The husband appeared
through an attorney and filed an answer denying the charges of
misconduct but not questioning the allegations of residence. A
divorce was granted the wife. Subsequently, the husband remarried
and died testate leaving all of his property to his daughter born of his
first wife. The second wife elected under New York law to take her
statutory share, and the daughter contested this election in New York
on the ground that the Florida divorce was invalid. The trial court
and the intermediate appellate court found against the child, but the
New York Court of Appeals reversed. The later court determined that
the child could attack collaterally in Florida and therefore had the
same right in New York. Thus it was concluded that the Florida judg-
ment bound only the parties themselves and not a third person, a
child of the previous marriage in this instance. The Supreme Court
25. E.g., In re Schomaker's Estate, 93 Cal. App. 2d 616, 209 P.2d 669 (1949);
see Rubinstein v. Rubinstein, 324 Mass. 340, 86 N.E.2d 654, 655 (1949).
26. See notes 27 and 28 infra.
27. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
1955 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
determined, contrary to the finding of the New York Court of Appeals,
that a daughter had no right to attack in Florida and that New York
must likewise deny the right in order for the decree to receive the
same respect in New York as it had in Florida.
And in a later case28 the estoppel issue was again presented to the
Supreme Court. Wife married husband number two, and subsequently
it was found that wife was still married to husband number one.
In accordance with a mutual agreement with husband number two,
wife went to Florida and obtained a decree. Wife and husband num-
ber two remarried. Husband number two thereafter filed a suit in
Vermont seeking to have both of his marriages annulled on the grounds
that his wife was still married when the first marriage was con-
tracted and that the wife's divorce was ineffective for lack of jurisdic-
tion. The Vermont Supreme Court held both marriages void. How-
ever, the Supreme Court of the United States assumed that if husband
number one appeared he would be bound. It then went on to hold
that if husband number one would be estopped, a third person, hus-
band number two, would probably have no standing under the Florida
law to attack the decree. There is no doubt but that many states
would have estopped husband number two from attacking the divorce
because of his conduct. But as pointed out by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
the doctrine of unclean hands is not a part of the Constitution. 29
Apparently it was the opinion of the Court that in Florida a stranger
can attack a decree that is presumed to be binding on the parties
only when he has a pre-existing interest at the time of the suit which
would be affected by the decree. This the husband did not have. How-
ever, the case was remanded to Vermont for a determination of the
Florida law on the second husband's rights.
The questions left unanswered by the Sherrer and Coe cases have
about been solved by the Johnson and Cook cases. There still remains
the problem of whether a state would be estopped. As indicated
above, there has been general belief that it would not be, but this
view has been considerably weakened by the Johnson and Cook
cases.
There is a point which should be kept in mind respecting the possi-
bility of estoppel. The question of whether one of the parties to a
suit, or a third person, can collaterally attack a decree should be
determined by the law of the rendering state. While there is little
likelihood that a party who has had the opportunity to raise the
jurisdictional issue would be given the chance to attack in the render-
ing state, it is not so clear that a third party would be foreclosed. At
any rate the right to assail the decree should be governed by the
law of the forum issuing the divorce. However, it is to be noted that
28. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
29. Id. at 132 (dissenting opinion).
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there is a presumption that a decree is free from attack, and the party
seeking to overturn it has the burden of proof.
30
There are two other divorce cases31 decided by the Supreme Court
that should be mentioned. In Estin v. Estin32 the wife had been
awarded a New York separation decree calling for permanent alimony.
Subsequently the husband went to Nevada and obtained an ex parte
divorce. After the divorce, the wife sued for alimony due under the
separation decree. The New York court held that the husband's
Nevada domicil was bona fide, but it, nevertheless, granted a judg-
ment for the arrears in alimony payments. The case was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court held that while
New York was required to give full faith and credit to the Nevada
decree insofar as the dissolution of the marriage was concerned, it
did not have to give similar effect to the decree on the issue of alimony.
It was held that personal jurisdiction over the wife was necessary
to alter the wife's interest in her New York decree. "The result
in this situation is to make the divorce divisible-to give effect to the
Nevada decree insofar as it affects the marital status and to make
it ineffective on the issue of alimony."33 The facts and holding were
similar in Kreiger v. Kreiger.3
Even under these tedious and technical rules that have been worked
out by the Supreme Court, not all decrees are entitled to full faith
and credit. Especially confusing, and the real source of trouble today,
is the ex parte decree in respect of which two or more states may make
conflicting findings on the issue of domicil.
In short:
"Lawyers don't know what in the world to advise their clients. Clients
don't know how to dispose of their property; or whether they are di-




In General: As. discussed above the recognition of divorce decrees
does not present near the difficulty today that it did prior to the
1940's. Under the Supreme Court rulings handed down since 1942,
one may obtain a migratory divorce decree and be reasonably assured
that it will be given full faith and credit elsewhere. However, there
is no such guarantee as to all decrees. It would not only appear that
society generally favors the granting of divorces, but that it is likewise
30. See statement in Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 128 (1951).
31. Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
(1948).
32. 334U.S. 541 (1948).
33. Id. at 549.
34. 334 U.S. 555 (1948).
35. Statement by Mr. Justice Jackson, 16 U.S.L. WEEK 3123 (Oct. 21, 1947).
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interested in their being respected in other states. No doubt this
public interest has been responsible for the Supreme Court's present
policy in supervising full faith and credit for sister state decrees. As
previously noted this policy is to maintain uniformity of status.
However necessary or desirable it is to promote certainty of status
there should not be a disregard of state interests, and there has not
been. In order to compensate for this factor, the Supreme Court has
continued to countenance attacks on certain decrees-mostly the ex
parte ones. However, this more or less compromising approach has
nonetheless resulted in greater emphasis being placed on the policy
of establishing uniformity of status. Therefore, under the present rules
state interests are overshadowed, whereas prior to the 1940's they
constituted the predominant consideration.
The question arises as to whether it is possible by the adoption of
alternatives to protect the interests of the states and individuals. If
so, in what areas could changes be made, and what are the advantages
of the alternatives? Assuming that there are certain possibilities that
may be adopted, in what ways could the changes be put into effect?
These questions and other related matters are the topics of the follow-
ing pages.
Constitutional Amendment: A possible change is to amend the Con-
stitution giving the federal government power over divorces. If this
were done, the Congress could then pass a federal law granting divorce
jurisdiction to certain courts, and the same law would prevail through-
out the Union. Such a proposal was first made in 1884, and some
seventy similar attempts have been made since that time.36 The
most recent efforts along these lines were made by the late Senator
Clapper. He first introduced such a proposal in 1923 and unsuccess-
fully continued his efforts periodically for a number of years.37 The
likelihood that this can be accomplished in the near future is very
slim. In a day and age when there is bitter controversy over the seizing
of state power by the federal government, the granting of power to
the federal government over domestic affairs, which have been tradi-
tionally regarded as state matters, would appear most unlikely. Even
if federal authority were established, the existing uncertainty would
not necessarily be removed nor could much improvement be expected
unless it were provided that the first court's finding of jurisdiction
would be conclusive.
Jurisdictional Basis: It is not at all settled as to how the notion was
formulated that the basis of jurisdiction for granting divorce is founded
on domicil. However, a statement by Story was probably more re-
36. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 305 (1942) (concurring
opinion).
37. Discussed in Ruymann, The Problem of Migratory Divorce: The Utility
or Futility of Federal Legislation, 37 A.B.A.J. 12, 14 (1951).
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sponsible for the selection of this factor as the basis than any other
authority. At an early date he wrote:
"Upon the whole the doctrine now firmly established in America upon
the subject of divorce is, that the law of the place of the actual bona fide
domicil of the parties gives jurisdiction to the proper courts to decree
a divorce for any cause allowed by the local law, without any reference
to the law of the place of the original marriage or the place where the
offense for which the divorce is allowed was committed."3 8
Suffice it to say that with but few exceptions domicil has been
treated as the sole jurisdictional basis for the dissolution of marriages
in the United States. 39 It was originally chosen as the factor to be
regarded as conferring power over the marital status for good reasons.
The nationality concept used elsewhere was not practical because
control over domestic affairs was retained by the states. Allegiance
to a state in a federation has never had the significance that it has in
relation to a nation.40 Therefore, since there was no national divorce
law some other basis had to be selected, and the choice was domicil.
This contact point was chosen because the domiciliary state was
viewed as the one with the principal interest. And the choice was a
good one for at that time domicil was a legal term of established mean-
ing and stability. When a person was a domiciliary of a place, he was
a member of that community and there were permanent attachments
and connections. Therefore, it was a relatively simple matter to de-
termine one's domicil. People did not migrate from one area to
another as they do today, nor were one's assets and interests spread
out in several states. However, as this country grew territorially and
technically, customs and legal concepts changed. With the advent
of better modes of transportation, people traveled more extensively
than they did when the means of transportation were in the pioneer
stage. And as the economic situation improved, it became not un-
common for people to maintain homes or residences in several states.
Later the courts permitted a married woman to acquire a domicil
apart from the one held by her husband for purposes of divorce.41
The cumulative effect of all these factors was to lessen the stability
that domicil once had. And to a greater extent than was probably
ever envisioned, domicil became dependent on mental inclinations.
Once this stage was reached, the recognition of divorce decrees started
38. STORY, COMMIVENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws, § 230a (8th ed. 1883).
Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87 (1856), appears to be the first case in which the
jurisdiction question was discussed.
39. GooricH, CO~NFLICT OF LAWS 396 (3d ed. 1949).
40. The fourteenth amendment reads: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. See Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1913), and cases cited therein.
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giving the courts trouble. The tribunals often reached conflicting re-
sults on the same facts.42
From the foregoing it can be seen that domicil was a sound juris-
dictional basis when it was adopted, but it is no longer a practical
concept upon which to base power to grant divorces.
In a discussion of judicial jurisdiction in the United States, it is
.most important that the due process clause be kept in mind. It is prin-
cipally under this power that state judicial proceedings are regulated.
The Supreme Court of the United States apparently treats the re-
quirements of the due process and full faith and credit clauses as
being coextensive.43 Thus extra-state enforcement is required for
those judicial proceedings in which the basis of jurisdiction is suffi-
cient under the fourteenth amendment. However it is not entirely
clear as to the relation between the requirements of the due process
and full faith and credit clauses. For instance, it has been intimated
that a state could assume power to grant a divorce on any basis it saw
fit without violating the fourteenth amendment.44 But at the same
time it has been stated that the decree would not be entitled to the
protection of the full faith and credit clause. 45 These indications not
only appear to be inconsistent with the Constitution, but are irrecon-
cilable with the holdings in cases involving ordinary law judgments. 40
On the other hand, there are innumerable statements in the Supreme
Court decisions that the state of domicil has the exclusive power to
grant a divorce.47 However, in each of these cases domicil was required
by the statute of the forum. In considering the sufficiency of a nexus
to give a state power over the marital status, it should be kept
in mind that no requirement of domicil is found in the Constitution
nor has this been specified by Congress. May there not be other rela-
tions between a state and individual which will create a sufficient
interest in the state under the due process clause to give it power to
decree divorces? If so, what states other than the place of domicile
could be regarded as having a substantial enough interest in the
marital status of an individual?
One state which might be regarded as having a sufficient interest in
a marital status to have power to sever it is the place in which the
marriage was consummated. Since the validity of a marriage is
42. Domicil has caused difficulty in other areas. See Knapp, Solutions of the
Double Domicil Problem, 15 CoNN. B.J. 251 (1941).
43. However, there is no express holding to this effect. On this see Alton
v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 675-76 (3d Cir. 1953).
44. Discussed in Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HAnv. L. REV. 930 (1945).
45. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 367 n.16 (1948) (dissenting opinion);
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 307 (1942) (concurring opinion).
46. Cf. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917); Riverside and
Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915).
47. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 349 (1948); Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1949); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,
297 (1942).
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partially, or entirely, determined by the law of the place of celebra-
tion, does that state not retain a special interest in the status of the
parties?4 8 By way of further analogy, it is noted that an annulment
may be granted by the state in which the ceremony became effective.
49
Why not also the power to dissolve the relationship? In what is per-
haps the only reported case upholding the power of the state of mar-
riage to grant a divorce, a New York Supreme Court recently ruled
that New York's statutory provision to this effect was valid.50 In up-
holding the provision it was pointed out:
"One of the most widely accepted rules of law is that the validity of a
marriage is determined by the law of the place where it is contracted...
and as the law of that place determines the validity of the marriage, I
cannot see why that place is not, also, at least an appropriate place for
determining whether or not and for what causes that marriage may be
dissolved.
"For a variety of other purposes, also, the law of the place where a
marriage takes place determines many of the rights and obligations of
the parties....
"Furthermore, in what certainly must be a large percentage of cases,
the place where a marriage takes place is the place where the parties
establish their home and the place where their children are born; and
even where they both thereafter leave that place and go their respective
ways in different places, the fact that they were married in a particular
place seems to me to supply a nexus between those persons and that
place which is at least as intimate and permanent as the. domicil of
either, ..."51
An acceptance of a rule providing that the state of marriage has the
power to grant divorces would about eliminate the possibility of
jurisdictional attack. Locating the place of celebration does not entail
delving into one's mental inclinations as does domicil. Thus, not only
would there be certainty as to the place in which divorces could be ob-
tained, but likewise almost complete assurance that a decree obtained
at that place would be free from attack. The granting of divorce
power to the place of marriage would not perhaps create ary great re-
sentment on the part of the state of matrimonial domicil. Probably
there would not be near the concern over citizens going back to the
place of marriage to have their marital relationships severed as there
is where citizens go to a state having lax divorce laws.
However, it should be pointed out that marriage in a state is often-
times the only contact that the parties have with the state. The locus
may have been selected in jest, fortuitously, or without a reasonable
purpose. Thus, the interests of the locus of marriage might not be
48. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 116 (3d ed. 1949).
49. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 321 (2d ed. 1951).
50. David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct.
1954).
51. 129 N.Y.S.2d at 655-56.
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substantial enough to be viewed as conferring power to sever the
relationship. Moreover, if the state of celebration were given the
exclusive power to award divorces much hardship would result. It
would be expensive and difficult, if not impossible, for some people
to return to this state for such relief. Rather than grant exclusive
jurisdiction to the state of marriage, concurrent power could be given
along with others with which there is a substantial tie.
Another state which might be considered as having a sufficient in-
terest in the marital status of persons to warrant its granting divorces
is the state of matrimonial domicil. By this is meant the place where
the parties last lived together as husband and wife. In fact this state
has been regarded by the Supreme Court as having the power to dis-
solve the marital relationship,52 although there involved was the addi-
tional factor that one of the parties was domiciled in the state at the
time suit was brought. When domicil was established as the jurisdic-
tional basis for divorce, the place of matrimonial domicil was perhaps
what the judiciary had in mind.53 This was where the parties had lived
together as husband and wife, settled down and become a part of
a community. In the event of a subsequent separation, the parties
usually continued to live in this community-but not so today. Upon
separation the husband or wife, or both, often leave the matrimonial
domicil and establish separate homes in other states. Thus, all ties with
this state .are severed. Therefore, the remaining interests of this
state, if any, might be insufficient under the due process clause to
sanction the granting of divorce. Moreover, if the parties do depart
from the state, could it not impose too great a burden to require return
to the state of matrimonial domicil to get a divorce? In favor of
conferring power to grant divorce on the state of matrimonial domicil
are the certainty and lack of attack factors referred to in the discussion
of the place of marriage. However, all in all, there would not seem to
be any great advantage in granting either exclusive or concurrent
power to this state to award decrees of divorce.
Another alternative basis is one that deserves special consideration.
It is residence. By residence is meant a person's place of abode as
distinguished from his permanent home place, or domicil, which is
presently used.54 As previously suggested, the distinction between
these two terms has become quite blurred, and it is often difficult to
separate the two with any degree of certainty. At the present time the
Court holds that the fact that one party is domiciled in a state furnishes
- a sufficient tie to permit that state to alter his marital status. Why
would not mere residence in a place likewise be a sufficient connecting
52. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
53. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 247 (1945) (dissenting
opinion).
54. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9, comments a and e (1934).
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link? Oftentimes one's domicil is in a state with which the person has
no substantial contact other than that it is designated as his home by
law. It matters not that he may have been absent for an extended
period of time or perhaps was never in the state. Yet his relationship
with this assigned home is deemed so important that the courts in that
state may alter his marital status. If residence were substituted for
domicil, there would be no necessity to inquire into mental attitudes.
If this basis were adopted, many states, or perhaps all, would still
deem it advisable to require'residence for a specified period of time
to prevent spurious suits and to keep itinerants out of the courts.
Assuming that this would be done, would there be any particular
advantage in substituting residence for domicil? Suppose the indi-
vidual took up residence, but spent considerable time in another state.
Would this not open the door for the relitigation of the jurisdictional
fact (residence for the required time) in a subsequent suit? It would
seem so unless it were provided that the findings of the original forum
were to be regarded as conclusive. A possibility here would be to set
up residence as the jurisdictional fact and to treat the period of resi-
dence as a quasi-jurisdictional fact as is now done by the federal
courts in some phases of diversity of citizenship. 55 However, unless
some such provision were made, we would be in no better position
respecting ex parte decrees than we are at the present time. But by
specifying residence as the basis no major change in the present re-
quirements would be met. Today the Supreme Court in effect permits
the granting of decrees on the basis of residence and under the guise of
estoppel requires full faith and credit for them.56 An express accept-
ance of residence would at least have the effect of enunciating the basis
to be used. While an adoption of residence as the jurisdictional basis for
divorce suits would facilitate the procurement of decrees as well as.
decrease the possibility of collateral attack, the result would be a
slighting of the valid concern of other states such as the place of domicil
and matrimonial domicil. Should these states be completely dis-
regarded in the attempt to protect individual interests by stabilizing
the marital states? One way in which to offset this increased protection
of private interests would be to adopt a new choice of law rule along
with the selection of residence as the jurisdictional basis.
The validity of a Virgin Islands statute, which conferred power on
the courts to grant divorces to residents, has recently been the subject
of litigation. The statute provides, among other things, that if a com-
plainant who has been a resident for six weeks secures personal service-
on the defendant, the court has jurisdiction over the action and is
precluded from any investigation of domicil. In the case of Alton v.
Alton the defendant waived service and appeared geneyally. The
55. See Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 17,3 (1893).
56. Cf. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
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plaintiff introduced evidence to establish her residence. However, she
failed to provide further evidence of domicil that was requested by
the court. Thereupon, the action was dismissed for want of jurisdic-
tion. Upon being taken to the court of appeals, the decision was
affirmed by a split court.
57
The majority found that the restrictions imposed upon the Virgin
Island government by the fifth amendment were similar to those im-
posed on the states by the fourteenth amendment. The court then held
that the provision of the statute authorizing divorces without reference
to domicil was repugnant to the requirements of due process of law
on the ground that the domiciliary state has so great an interest in the
marriage status of its inhabitants that it has exclusive power to grant
divorce. After having agreed to review the case, the Supreme Court
dismissed on the ground that the issue had become moot because of
a subsequent decree obtained by the husband in Connecticut.58 The
Virgin Islands statute was also at issue in the recent case of Granville-
Smith v. Granville-Smith.59 The court of appeals affirmed the
dismissal of the lower court on the basis of its decision in the prior
case of Alton v. Alton. On being taken to the Supreme Court, the
decision was affirmed.60 The Court based its decision on the conclusion
that the Virgin Islands Legislative Assembly had not been given power
by Congress to pass the statute which the Court found to be "designed
for people outside the Virgin Islands." The Court clearly indicated
that none of the substantive questions (jurisdictional issue and choice
of law rule) raised below were considered. However, implicit in the
decision is the point that domicil is the sole jurisdictional basis in
divorce suits. This was pointed out in the dissenting opinion:
'"The majority's holding that the Island's law is not of 'local application'
can be appreciated more fully by asking the question, 'What type of
divorce law would be of local application?' The majority does not pass on
this, but its whole reasoning is founded on the proposition that only domicil
will suffice."61
Another change that could be made along jurisdictional lines would
be to recognize presence as a basis for jurisdiction in divorce actions.
In other words, any state in which the plaintiff is present and in which
suit is filed would be regarded as having the power to sever that
person's marital status. An analogous situation is that involving the
situs of a debt. At one time it was held that the situs of a debt for
purposes of garnishment proceedings was the domicil of the debtor.02
57. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953).
58. 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
59. 214 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1954).
60. 75 Sup. Ct. 553 (1955).
61. Id. at 565 (dissenting opinion).
62. STumBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 107 (2d ed. 1951).
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However, it is generally recognized today that the debt may be at-
tached for purposes of garnishment at any place where the debtor may
be found.63 On the basis of this reasoning, why should not a person's
presence be deemed to place his marital status before the court? This
is not to suggest that the forum should apply its own divorce laws in
such a suit. However, the defendant's presence could be looked upon
as conferring power on the court over the plaintiff's marital status.
What advantages would an adoption of residence as the jurisdictional
contact have over domicil? One point in its favor would be the cer-
tainty of jurisdiction. There would be no necessity of inquiring into
one's intent. Not only would certainty as to the forum be achieved,
but there would be little chance of collateral attack on the jurisdic-
tional issue. If this basis were chosen, the interests of other states
could be secured by requiring that the law of the proper state be
utilized-possibly the law of the place of matrimonial domicil, or of
the place of marriage. However, it should be kept in mind that mere
presence might not be regarded as a sufficient tie to meet the require-
ments of the due process clause.
64
It is not suggested that any of the above-mentioned places be granted
exclusive power to grant divorce. At the same time there is no recom-
mendation that we continue to view the state of domicil as having the
sole power to award divorce decrees. Why not sanction the rendition
of decrees by several, if not all, of the above states? Each of them has a
vital tie with a person seeking divorce and his status. While the in-
terests of some of these states are greater than those of others, it is
difficult to conclude that any one of them has such a vital concern so
as to have exclusive power.
Choice of Law: It is now well settled in this country that the rule of
jurisdiction and the rule of reference in divorce actions are the same.65
Because of the fact that jurisdiction to divorce is based on domicil and
the fact that the place of domicil provides the law to be applied, the
courts talk about the rule of reference in terms of jurisdiction. In
other words, the law of the forum reigns supreme in these suits. In
many of the recent Supreme Court cases there have been vigorous
dissents to the majority opinions, which have required full faith and
credit for the decrees involved. The usual basis of these dissents is
that by the decision in the particular case one state is given~the right
to meddle into the affairs of another state.66 After having made this
statement, the dissenter usually ends his say with a discussion of
domicil.67 Perhaps the thing that is regarded as being wrong in these
63. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
64. Notes 46-50 supra.
65. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 294 (2d ed. 1951).
66. See, e.g., the dissenting opinion in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.
287, 308, 311 (1942).
67. Id. at 320 (dissenting opinion).
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cases is that the improper law was used in granting the divorce. How-
ever, this concern is not spelled out, and the reader is usually left with
the impression that the dissenter thought that there was an improper
determination on the jurisdictional point.
In deciding the proper law to be applied to facts that cut across
state lines, the courts usually try to locate the state that has the
greatest interest in the transaction, and then to apply the law of that
state. This means that the role of the forum is thereby minimized, and
the fact that the suit is brought in a state does not ordinarily provide a
sufficient interest in the case to permit, or warrant, the court's ap-
plying its own law. As a matter of fact, it has been held that a court
must apply the proper law, that is, the law of the state having the
greatest interest in the transaction upon which suit has been brought.6 8
In order that the proper law will be applied in all cases, the courts
have developed choice of law rules to be used. The law of the forum is
not usually held to govern unless there are other contacts in that state.
The complaint given against the use of its own law by the forum in a
divorce action is that the petitioner was not established in the state
long enough to warrant the use of that law. It would seem that this is
not the real basis of the grievance at all. What difference does it make
whether the petitioner has lived in the state for six weeks or six years?
The question is whether the forum's law should be applied, irrespective
of the length of residence. It should, however, be recognized that the
jurisdictional basis must be founded on a tie or connection with the
forum, and at the same time there must be a substantial relation
between a transaction and a state in order for its law to be applicable.
In divorce suits the state of domicil has been regarded as supplying
both of these requirements. However, the fact that the forum has an
interest in one's marital status so that it may sever it does not neces-
sarily mean that the forum's interest is sufficient to permit the use of
its divorce laws. Thus, in the recent Granville-Smith case69 had the
Supreme Court ruled on the jurisdictional issue it might have been
held that the Virgin Islands could grant divorces to residents; but that
it would be a violation of the due process clause or full faith and credit
clause, or both, for the Virgin Islands to apply its own divorce laws in
such a proceeding.
That there are rules of reference, other than the domicil rule, which
might be more appropriate has seldom been recognized. The one that
immediately comes in focus is that in a divorce action the law of the
place of wrong should govern. In suits which are characterized as tort
problems, the courts apply the law of the place of the tort, or as they
68. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See also Hartford Acc. &
Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
69. Note 62 supra.
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often state, the law of the place where the wrong was committed.70
However, the place of wrong has had little significance in divorce
litigation in the United States. In some states it is provided by statute
that the act claimed as a ground for divorce must have arisen in the
state in which the decree is sought.71 Ordinarily, this is not the case.
The usual requirement is that the act, irrespective of where it was
committed or whether it was grounds for divorce at the place where
committed, must be a statutory ground at the forum.7 2 Beale wrote
that the place of wrong is immaterial because divorce is not punish-
ment for a wrong done by one spouse to the other. His thought was
that the right to divorce should be determined by the law where the
effect of the act is felt and that the effect is felt at the domicil of the
injured party.7 3 Beale's statement was quite valid at the time made,
but changed circumstances have rendered it less convincing. Under
the first Williams case,7 4 a divorce may be had by either party and at
his place of domicil; thus, the effect is felt, or may be felt, in two
states. Moreover, the courts do not always agree on where these
domicils are established. In addition the act would appear to have
greater significance than that attributed to it by Beale. In short, no
sufficient act, no divorce. However, use of the law of the place of the
wrong would likewise present similar problems. While it would not
be difficult to fix the place where such acts as physical cruelty and
adultery occurred, the location of the place of the wrong would not be
nearly so easy respecting other grounds such as mental cruelty, in-
compatability, impotence, desertion, non-support, or insanity. Where
would such acts as these which cannot be "nailed-down" to any one
place be deemed to have occurred? While the place of the wrong
would appear to have a substantial enough interest to warrant the use
of its divorce laws, employment of this choice-of-law rule would in all
probability prove to be most impracticable.
Now there is yet another rule of reference that should be considered.
It is suggested by Beale's observation. His view was that the law of the
place where the impact of the act on the marital relation is felt should
be applied. What place is this? Is it the state of the domicil of the
respective parties at a subsequent date, or is it the place which was
most affected at the time the act was committed? The latter would
seem to be more logical. Why not use the law of the place where the
parties were living together as husband and wife, their matrimonial
domicil, at the time that the act occurred? The adoption of such a rule
70. GoODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 260 (3d ed. 1949).
71. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 294 (2d ed. 1951).
72. Ibid.
73. 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 472 (1935).
74. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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of reference has been suggested in the past by several authorities.75
Just how would the use of this formula work in a given case? Con-
sider the Williams case. If the Nevada court had applied North Caro-
lina law, then North Carolina might not have complained about the
fact that Nevada was interfering with her internal affairs. North
Carolina was perhaps more concerned about Nevada law being used
to grant divorce than it was with the fact that Nevada was the forum
for the proceeding. However, this anxiety is usually submerged in the
discussion of jurisdiction.
A possible objection to the rule that the forum must apply the
divorce act of the place of matrimonial domicil is that if the act com-
plained of is not a ground there, divorce can never be had. That this
could be true cannot be refuted. However, this is a problem irrespec-
tive of the choice of law rule used. Moreover, it is something which is
found in other areas of conflicts such as tort and contract litigations.
In annulment cases,76 as well as those of marriage validity, 7 resort is
usually had to the law of the place of marriage. Yet the law of this
state has not generally been applied in divorce cases in the United
States. If a marital relationship is created by compliance with the laws
of a given state, is it not arguable that the dissolution of this status
should likewise be governed by that law? This is not to say that the
state in which the ceremony was performed should be given exclusive
power to entertain suit for divorce. However, irrespective of the loca-
tion of the forum, application of the law of the place of marriage could
be made. In order for such a rule of reference to be valid under the
due process clause, it would be necessary for there to be a substantial
tie with the place of marriage. Is there such a contact? No doubt there
is in many cases, but in others there is little or no contact with the
state after the ceremony has been performed. Thus, resort to this law
in all cases might well be invalid. The most that could be said for it
would be that in most instances it would be easy to pinpoint the state of
marriage which would make for uniformity.
By Whom Changes Could Be Made: Assuming that a new choice of
law rule should be adopted and that the jurisdictional basis for divorce
actions should be modified in some respects, what body has the power
to provide for the changes?
From time to time in the past there have been suggestions made that
Congress has the power to legislate in respect to divorce suits. Power
for such legislation might be found in the due process clause or the
full faith and credit clause. Thus, pursuant to this delegated authority,
75. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 463 (1942);
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
CoLum. L. REV. 1, 14 (1945).
76. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 418 (2d ed. 1948).
77. Id. at 351.
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our national legislature could prescribe the rule of reference to be used
as well as the jurisdictional basis.
However, it should be noted that suggestions along these lines have
been made for many decades, just as have the attempts to amend the
Constitution. 8 These futile attempts over a long period of time clearly
indicate a reluctance on the part of the Congress to interfere with a
matter that is being handled by the Supreme Court and which has
traditionally been regarded as principally a state problem. Even back
in 1906 it was intimated that there was serious doubt as to any hope
of obtaining federal legislation on the subject.7 9 Moreover, it has been
suggested by one authority that it is questionable as to whether some
of the propositions would be constitutional. His point is that perhaps
there is no room for congressional changes due to the interpretations
placed on the various provisions of the Constitution by the Supreme
Court.80 Thus, there is the possibility that presence in the forum could
not be validly prescribed as a jurisdictional basis for divorce actions
since the Supreme Court seems to indicate that only domicil is
sufficient under the due process clause.
It would appear that the Supreme Court could also modify the
present choice-of-law rule and jurisdiction concept. These changes
could perhaps be made even in the absence of federal legislation.
After all, the present rules are ones designed or approved by the Court.
However, in order for the Court to do this, it will be necessary for it
to "back track." But when the status of the law is surveyed, it is
generally agreed that the Court has gone too far, and probably a drastic
change would not only be the most appropriate, but the most logical
solution. However, it should be kept in mind that the Supreme Court
might take the attitude that it is without power to make modifications.
Most of the rules that the Court has set down have resulted from the
interpretations placed by the Court on the due process and full faith
and credit clauses. To only a very limited extent has it been necessary
to consider congressional legislation insofar as divorce decrees are
concerned. If the present court rules reflect the requirements of the
constitutional provisions, is there any basis upon which the Supreme
Court could set up different prescriptions?
Speciftcation of Decrees to Receive Full Faith and Credit: All of the
above proposals deal with incidents of the original suit for divorce.
In addition to those considerations there are other modifications or
additions which should be given thought.
78. See Franklin, The Dilemma of Migratory Divorces: A Partial Solution
Through Federal Legislation, 1 OKLA. L. REV. 151 (1948); Ruymann, The
Problem of Migratory Divorce: The Utility or Futility of Federal Legislation,
37 A.B.A.J. 12 (1951).
79. Ashley, Conflict of Laws Upon the Subject of Marriage and Divorce, 15
YALE L.J. 387, 391 (1906).




Congress has been given broad power, under the full faith and
credit clause, to prescribe the faith to be accorded judicial proceedings
of sister states. Could not legislation setting forth the decrees that are
to be awarded recognition be enacted under this power?81 Congress
has exercised the authority conferred on it by the full faith and credit
clause to only a limited extent. The task of working out the detailed
rules has been left to the Supreme Court; however, the power to
legislate is available to our national legislature. Thus, detailed specifi-
cations to be followed in the field of due credit for divorce decrees
could be provided by this body. Moreover, it would appear that the
present rules that have been laid down by the Supreme Court could
be modified. The only real efforts to obtain such legislation were made
by the late Senator McCarran. He introduced a bill in the Senate for
several years. It was passed by the Senate at the second session of
the Eighty-second Congress, 82 but was never reported out of the House
Judiciary Committee. The Senate also approved the bill when it was
presented in the Eighty-third Congress.8 3 The text of the proposed
McCarran Act is as follows:
"[W]here a State has exercised through its courts jurisdiction to dis-
solve the marriage of spouses, the decree of divorce thus rendered must
be given full faith and credit in every other State as a dissolution of such
marriage, provided (1) the decree is final as to the issue of divorce; (2) the
decree is valid in the State where rendered; (3) the decree contains
recitals setting forth that the jurisdictional prerequisites of such State to
the granting of the divorce have been met; and (4) the State wherein the
decree was rendered was the last State wherein the spouses were domiciled
together as husband and wife, or the defendant in the proceeding for
divorce was personally subject to the jurisdiction of the State wherein
the decree was rendered or appeared generally in the proceedings therefor.
In all such cases except cases involving fraudulent conduct of the success-
ful party which was practiced during the course of an actual adversary
trial of the issues joined and the effect of which was directly and affirma-
tively to mislead the defeated party to his injury after he announced that
he was ready to proceed with the trial, the recitals of the decree of divorce
shall constitute a conclusive determination of the jurisdictional facts
necessary to the decree."
84
Several people have observed that an adoption of this bill would
result in nullifying the Williams cases. However, its sponsors have
denied that this is a purpose of the bill. In fact, they have stated that
where the four conditions are not met, decrees would be left exactly
where they stand now.85 Moreover, in answer to the question, Will this
81. Corwin, The Full Faith and Credit Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 371, 388
(1933).
82. S. 1331, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
83. S. 39, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
84. Ibid.
85. 99 CONG. REC. 4575 (1953).
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bill legalize "quickie" divorces, where one spouse goes to Nevada and
gets a divorce by default?, Senator McCarran said: "The answer is, it
will not. This bill would have no effect whatever on the question of
the validity of such a divorce.
'8 6
If this proposal were enacted, there would doubtless be confusion on
this point in spite of the statements made by the author and sponsors
of the bill. In addition to this ambiguity, it might also be noted that
the bill prescribes full faith and credit for certain decrees if they are
valid in the rendering state. What is meant by this? Did the author
intend that only local law was to be used and that the constitutional
requirements were to be disregarded in deciding this point? If so,
might not this bill be unconstitutional? If, on the other hand, validity is
to be tested under the local law and the Constitution, what is to be
gained? Is this not the problem respecting divorce decrees?
But regardless of the merits of the McCarran Act, it is at least illus-
trative of legislation that could be passed by Congress. And such
specifications should be enacted since Congress, and not the Supreme
Court, was given the power under the full faith and credit clause to
prescribe the manner in which full faith and credit is to be accorded.
86. Ibid.
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